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Summary: The traditional vision of genocide is exogenous. In this framework, ethnies 
have a real sense. The economic approach of conflicts has expressed slight differences in 
the relation between ethnies and conflicts. However it does not reject this explanation. 
Here we propose an alternative approach, an endogenous vision of genocide. Genocide 
appears in society where social capital plays a major role in solidarities. But social capi-
tal is a weak asset in the individual portfolio. Economic and social shocks may have im-
pacts on the assets structure and may produce conflicts such as genocide. In this new 
framework, policy makers may have to adopt prudential rules. 
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Genocide means killing anyone for genetic reasons and race. But generally it has 
a social sense, concerning extermination of millions of people for “hating man as 
a man” (Ballet et al. 2007). In human history, given the growing population, 
genocide concerns more and more people and can be measured in millions (6 in 
Europe in the 40’s, 2 in Cambodia, 1 in Armenia, 1 in Rwanda/Burundi). Geno-
cide is an absolute estimation; ethnocide considers the death of a large propor-
tion of an ethnic group as in colonisation by Europeans. It is a moral tragedy for 
civilisation and in all the cases, an economic fact with huge material and human 
consequences. 
The main consideration of this phenomenon has been socio-ethnic. In 
Africa the main reasons are ethnic and especially ethnic fragmentation since 
Easterly (2008). Furthermore, ethnic conflicts, in this recent economic literature 
presuppose an “objectivity” of ethnic groups. This realism is denied by modern 
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ethnology; ethnic group being a construction, made sometimes by the “genocid-
ers” themselves, not a reality. This is an argument of the historian Mark Levene 
(1999) emphazing the difficulties of the genociders to delimit the populations to 
kill. His explanation of genocides is political, as an act of a desperate regime. 
Religious, political, ethnical factors are omnipresent as if in these cir-
cumstances, universal behaviour had disappeared. More generally, in Africa as 
in Europe, genocide is a matter of “anthropology”, between “appolinian” and 
“dionisian” populations (Benedict (2005); Mead (2000)), thesis renewed about 
the Shoah by Goldhagen (1997). Economic analysis has proposed an exogenous 
theory of ethnocide and ethny. We oppose endogenous theory of ethnocide and 
conflicts to an objective delimitation of ethnicity. 
In the exogenous version, Africa is poor because it is unstable and its in-
stability derives from its ethnic complexity. Conversely we assume that Africa is 
unstable because it is poor. Social capital becomes a critical asset in these coun-
tries. When it is intense and resources are rare, any economic or social shock 
may transform benevolence into malevolence, passing through ethnic re-
creation. 
In this context economic development policy is not at fault and new pru-
dential considerations must be advanced about economic policy development. 
 
 
1. The exogenous vision of ethnocide and ethny versus the endogenous vi-
sion of genocide. 
 
In the exogenous vision of ethnocide and ethny, economic fragmentation is pos-
tulated as if ethnic groups had a real sense. For instance, Easterly (1997, 2008) 
has constructed an indicator of ethnic fragmentation on the basis of data pub-
lished by soviet geographers. 
So an indicator may be built with the number of ethnic groups and the 
population of each ethnic group. Then regressions may be done between the 
number of ethnic groups and the economic performance. For instance according 
to the above authors, ethnic diversity explains relatively the poor economic per-
formances of Africa. The economic approach of conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 
2008) has expressed faint differences in relations between ethnies and conflicts. 
For instance, as quoted by Bates (2008), there is a non-monotonic relation. 
Why are Rwanda or Burundi with two supposed ethnic groups so poor and why 
was Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) with 80 ethnic groups able to be a model for 
Africa? This can be interpreted in a dynamic way, the performance of Côte 
d’Ivoire in the 70’s without ethnic confrontation, the crisis of the 90's being in-
terpreted by ethnic confrontation. 
These results are controversial, first on the reality of ethnic groups. 
Where are the ethnic groups in France? Populations of the underdeveloped coun-On Genocide, Economic Reasons vs. Ethnic Passion 
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tries are not primitive populations as a field of ethnology. Ethnicity is an inter-
personal representation changing with the context. What does ethnicity mean in 
the mega towns and with a large crossbreeding? An ethnic re-creation may take 
place with economic difficulties and a xenophobic State policy in such a case 
that the mentality of representations change. For instance the popular representa-
tion of Jews in France may change at any moment: they can be seen first as or-
dinary French people or first by their community reference. 
In this last case, the social preference is “malevolent altruism” to exter-
nalise frustrations against others and to prefer the disappearance of others by 
migration even by death. This allows a better density, diminishes the struggle for 
life, the social recurrent costs for others, the access to the best professions (See 
for instance, the 18
th October 1940 law in France). In some cases this is the con-
dition of a new social equilibrium with “new” property rights in each party. 
Genocide is an important way of wealth reallocations. 
Genocide begins with an identity research, “a person’s sense of self” 
(Nyborg, Howarth and Brekke (2006) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000)) into a 
social context, seeing oneself through the eyes of the others. For instance, char-
acteristics may be developed by created signs (yellow star in Europe, blue scarf 
in Cambodia), imagined characteristics (height as in Rwanda/Burundi), religious 
origins, differentiated housing (ghettoisation).There is a “re-creation” of identity, 
managed by the State to marginalize and exclude.From a political point of view, 
State may be weakened by external shocks (military defeats, wide liberalisation) 
and has to be restored by nationalism. 
So, there is a strong relation between identity and genocide phenomena, 
interaction rationalised and managed by the State. The economic precondition is 
a weak economic tissue and a shock of economic policy. These situations corre-
spond to Germany in the 1930’s, Turkey in 1915, Rwanda/Burundi in the 
1990’s, West Africa in the beginning of the 2000’s. 
The ethnic point of view is not immediate but begins when the economic crisis 
occurs, all the capacities being used and beginning to be destroyed. The eco-
nomic pre-situations may be very different: huge unemployment and inflation 
(Germany), high population density on poor lands (Rwanda, Burundi), low re-
turns on expanding rental production (West Africa). 
The external shock may occur from markets and from policies. For in-
stance, policy remedies may be strong as liberalisation of economic institutions 
(marketing boards, credit), big incentives to produce “tradables”, money injec-
tions and growing debt. These strong economic and social policies may be un-
sustainable and destroy social networks and personal capacities. 
Social crime as genocide appears as the result of an anomic society and 
of an external shock, especially unsustainable socio-economic conditionalility 
imposed by institutions. It specially takes place in societies where social capital 
plays a major role in solidarities. Jérôme Ballet, Damien Bazin and François-Régis Mahieu 
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2. Social capital as weak asset 
 
Narayan and Pritchett (1999) mean by social capital “the quantity and quality of 
associational life and the related social norms”. Their survey asks individuals 
about their membership in voluntary associations or groups, the quality “inclu-
sive” or “exclusive” of group’s membership. Therefore, the index of village as-
sociational life is a proxy for social capital. There is a preconception about the 
beneficial effects of social capital. A high index of sociability implies higher in-
comes, better economic and educational performances. Grootaert and Van Baste-
laer (2002) follows this assertion, arguing that social capital has long-term bene-
fits, especially for poor households, such as better access to credit and a resulting 
better ability to smoothen out income fluctuations by borrowing and/or accumu-
lating assets. According to Fafchamps and Minten (2002), in Madagascar “indi-
viduals with better relationship capital can conduct business with each other in a 
safer and cheaper manner”. 
Social capital is greater or less according to societies and their econo-
mies. It is seen strongly in certain poor societies, notably in informal urban pro-
duction and in rural activity. It manifests itself more visibly by important eco-
nomic transfers where social protection remains essentially private and founded 
on intergenerational relations. 
Social capital plays a great part in poor societies, where transfers or plu-
riactivity are the main components of the capability to survive. But this huge 
part of social capital in the assets is explosive. This social capital is volatile and 
very fragile. Under certain assumptions we can consider that social capital as a 
weak asset in the individual portfolio. Every individual has not only physical, 
financial and human capital, but also social capital. The latter may be predomi-
nant in poor societies.  
First assumption is an inverse relation between individual revenue and 
risk of conflicts. In this case, poverty appears as strong determinant of conflicts. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2008) confirm this assumption. Second assumption is an 
inverse relation between State’s redistribution and risk of conflicts. We may as-
sume that government redistribution toward the population, without negative 
discrimination, ensures a minimal social stability and reduces risk of conflicts. In 
both hypotheses risk must be interpreted as a probability that a conflict may be 
brought about. Third assumption is an inverse relation between private solidarity 
and State’s solidarity. Private solidarity is a part of social capital, and then we 
have an inverse relation between social capital and State redistribution. If indi-
viduals can’t have grants from government, they express a demand of solidarity 
in their private network. 
Figure 1 represents all the society feasible configurations at a moment of 
time. Quadrant I relates feasible structures concerning individual assets. We dis-
tinguish between social capital and others assets, represented here by the private On Genocide, Economic Reasons vs. Ethnic Passion 
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revenue Yi. Point A indicates individuals’ optimisation on the assets structure, 
with the curve representing individuals’ preferences and the inverse relation the 
feasible structures in the society. The angle of the straight line, passing through 
A and starting from the axis origin, corresponds to a proportion, here named a, 
indicating the relative parts of social capital and others assets in the individual 
assets portfolio. Quadrant II links risk of conflicts to the level of revenue. When 
the revenue increase risk of conflicts decrease. It is our second assumption. 
Quadrant III represents our second assumption which draws the inverse relation 
between State’s redistribution and risk of conflicts. Finally, Quadrant IV repre-
sents the relation between government solidarity and private solidarity or social 
capital.  
We have to make a clear difference between all the feasible structure of 
the society at a moment of time and the situation of this society. Feasible struc-
tures depend on economic, social and cultural determinants whereas the situation 
at a moment of time reflects the state of social tensions, redistribution mecha-
nisms and possibilities of production. On figure 1, the polygon drawn by a heavy 
line represents all the feasible structures of the society. The dotted line indicates 
the situation of this society. It depends on individuals’ choices on their assets 
portfolio. This set of society relations or configurations allows us to examine 
effects of economic policies on risk of conflicts.  
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Figure 2 analyses consequential effects of a shock on revenues. The initial situa-
tion is at point A1, with a risk of conflicts r1. An economic shock on revenues, 
decreasing them, may imply two cases. In the first case, the shock has no effect 
upon the assets structure. It only induces a decrease of private revenue Yi. Indi-
viduals optimisation moves from A1 to A2, with a new risk of conflicts r2 higher 
than r1. We may interpret this case as the consequence of poverty increase. In 
the second case, the assets structure changes. The optimisation is now on point 
A3, with a risk of conflicts r3 higher than r1 and r2. The meaning of this second 
case may be linked to an ethnic or community re-creation. When the private 
revenue decreases, individuals search and create private solidarity centralised on 
a community or an ethnic group even if this ethnic group must be re-created. In 
consequence, opposition between communities or ethnies may be developed and 
the risk of conflicts between them is increasing. 
 























Figure 3 shows the consequential effects of a social capital development policy. 
On this figure, two cases appear also. In the first case, the assets structure 
doesn’t change. Development of social capital allows to valorize the others as-
sets. Individuals’ optimisation is displaced from the initial situation A1 to A2. 
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tation may be the following. As social capital is developing, it ensures the val-
orization of others forms of capital, and implies an increase of revenues. As pov-
erty is diminished risk of conflicts is weaker. The policy has a beneficial effect. 
In the second case, policy induces a change in the assets structure. Individual 
optimisation move from A1 to A3, with a new risk of conflicts r3 higher than r1. 
Here, policy has a negative effect. We may understand this effect as the conse-
quence of the policy incentive. As policy valorizes social capital, individuals are 
encouraged to invest in this form of capital. They may do it by a re-creation of 
communities and ethnies. Private income decreases whereas social income in-
creases. As the matter of fact, as ethnies are re-created, risk of conflicts is 
higher. 

























Figure 4 represents a change in the redistributive government policy, precisely a 
cut in the redistribution. On this figure two cases appear also. In the first case, 
individuals can’t use social capital. The redistribution cut produces a change 
from A1 to A2. Risk of conflicts is higher, increasing from r1 to r2. Two inter-
pretations may be made in this case. First, as government expenditures decrease, 
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government cuts in its expenditures, it develops more clientelism increasing con-
flicts between groups, those who benefit from the redistribution and those who 
are excluded. In the second case, individuals change their assets structure, react-
ing to the policy by a higher use of private solidarity. Then, the situation is now 
on point A3 with more social capital. It corresponds to a higher risk of conflicts. 
Because individuals need private solidarity to compensate the cut in government 
grants, social capital increases. Meanwhile, as creation or re-creation of commu-
nities or ethnies is a means to obtain social income, opposition between ethnies 
or communities may be developed. 
 























In fact, we may assume there is a volatility of human behaviour in distress as 
there are panics on the markets. This volatility concerns social capital, a pre-
dominant factor in the poors’ portfolios. Therefore, the structure of this personal 
portfolio changes by the sign of the social capital. But there is also in most of the 
cases a structural modification in this structure or a sub- structure as an alloca-
tion of time. For instance, in poor rural pluriactivity, allocation of time between 
embedded activities is very weak and it is the capacity to survive. Any change 
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the neighbours in high population density create new conflicts in new areas. And 
maybe population changes without any control. 
 
A perturbation of the personal asset structure is accompanied by changes in so-
cial capital. If the disturbance of the capacity to survive is too high, this is a 
source of malevolence and implies a calculus about social crime, reinforced by 
expectations on other calculus.  
In this case, self expectation of other malevolence induces either auto-
migration or murder, according to the forces in action. In another sense, migra-
tion depends on the probability of being murdered and the probability of murder-
ing according to a presupposed identity. 
 
 
3. Policies implications 
 
Genocide is a case of extreme destructuration following a destabilisation of per-
sonal assets. This implies a stability hypothesis on the structure of assets, in this 
case of social capital/other assets considered by the real income Yi/p. The capital 
social amount depends on the social effort multiplier as an amount of money. 
The policy implication is to stabilize this structure and to avoid a social “big 
push” according to a social precaution principle: the supply of social resources 
must not be superior to a corresponding demand which is constant in the short 
term. Supply of social resources appeared with the social dimension of adjust-
ment policies of the World Bank (social funds), high labour intensity programs 
of ILO, and more recently with Social Capital programs. 
Each person holds a composite capital with very different assets: eco-
nomic, social, human, cultural, etc. In the case of the poors, social capital plays a 
major role in these assets, money or finance being scarce by definition. Social 
capital allows informal activities or transfers which are the main capabilities in 
case of monetary poverty. But social capital is a potential resource which implies 
a social effort or transmission (for instance repeated visits to many persons, mul-
tiplication of social links, spreading information and social signs). This social 
effort or social multiplier (in other terms, the velocity of socialisation) is called 
here, s. 
The key ratio, as shown in the last figures, is Social Capital (S), related 
to the other real resources as p.Yi. This ratio, S/pYi, expresses the state of “real” 
socialisation as 1/s or k.  
 
S/pYi = 1/s = k                            (1) 
 
This is a representation of the personal asset structure, and k = 1, is constant in 
the short term (an old monetarist assumption). Jérôme Ballet, Damien Bazin and François-Régis Mahieu 
  494 
If s, the social multiplier is equal to 1, this shows a strong social interac-
tion. In another manner, this strong social interaction may be written: 
 
ΔS.s = Δ p. Yi.    with    s = 1         (2) 
Social capital (absolute) variation is equal to real assets (absolute) variation. So-
cial capital may be considered as a complement of individual goods and a con-
straint on every utility function (Becker, 2000). 
In this case, s is constant in the short term as a structural relation, the 
capital or asset structure being not modified. 1/s is very important because social 
efforts are expected to return “social” and then individual incomes. This return 
on social investment, as shown by Becker (1974), may be negative and this may 
be the consequence of envy or hatred (malevolence or negative altruism). To 
simplify, we will take malevolence as a situation where the relationship dUi/dUj 
is negative. This relationship is known as the coefficient of altruism indicated as 
α. This coefficient may be positive (benevolence), negative (malevolence) or nul 
(neutrality) and may be analysed for one or more persons, and their environ-
ment. 
The nature of altruism is the key variable of the society concerned. For 
instance, a negative value (malevolence) of altruism coefficient α may be asso-
ciated to a lack or an excessive development of Ss. In the case of genocide, there 
is an intensive social capital in a society for a group and against the other, a high 
value of the social multiplier s. A group with intensive positive social capital and 
high resources may fragment between positive and negative social capital ac-
cording to the divided groups. 
If s is important, policies may develop adjustment policies to improve 
pYi and then the capital structure changes and α may change also. A socialisa-
tion of the poor may be malevolent, directed against a common enemy as in 
Germany in the 1930’s and in most of the cases of genocide: s grows and the 
altruism coefficient becomes negative. Might this socialisation be benevolent as 
projected by the development planners?  
If we refer to the identity above, a policy directed on the components of 
individual assets (Yi) has important consequences on socialisation. This is the 
problem of the omission of social effects in the framework of structural adjust-
ment policies and of their potential responsibility about conflicts. 
For many poor people 1/s is an optimal ratio, preferred to others, taking 
in account the monetary constraints. In many situations, the main objective 
would be a stabilization of ΔS.s. on one hand and of p.Yi on the other, or to 
elaborate a simulation of the social disagreements linked to the adjustment poli-
cies on S/pYi. 
When social capital Ss, is intense and other resources are rare, any eco-
nomic or social shock may transform benevolence into malevolence.  On Genocide, Economic Reasons vs. Ethnic Passion 
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This difficulty compels the analyst to be very careful when enlarging the 
notion of capital. Though social capital is heterogeneous and therefore may not 
give results in one particular direction. The specificity of social capital for an 
economist is due to the fact that it may have negative components, in particular, 
accumulated malevolence, as well as benevolence. 
 
For instance, the multi-altitude societies (see Murra (1981)) of the great Africa 
lakes region observed a socio-economic equilibrium such as a dense population 
has a sufficient productivity on pluri-activity to survive without assistance. 
The determinants of life are very weak allocations of time and so real exchange 
rates between activities. In a small enclosed economy as Burundi or Rwanda, 
formal and informal productions are the two sectors of the production possibility 
surface. There is a positive relation between formal activities and intrarural mi-
gration, up to a limit where migration is accelerated according to growing dis-
equilibrium between activities and the peculiar terrace cultivation. Conflicts are 
unavoidable in such a context and take the well-known ethnic form, for instance 
between “smalls” (Hutus) and “talls” (Tutsis). The labour intensive programs, as 
imagined by experts, are more efficient on ethnic conflicts than on economic 
development. Then underdevelopment lies in a primary overvaluation of trad-





The development policy is based on “big push”, “structural adjustment”, a vari-
ety of external shocks not only on the nation’s assets and activities structure, but 
also on everyone's economic structure. The social consequences of these plans 
may be very different according to very complex configurations. In poor econo-
mies context relation between social capital, other personal assets and conflicts 
depend on structural components such as k, but also on conjonctural elements as 
social transmission, s and altruism. Genocide is a special case of altruism where 
killing others is the only way to survive in a social context where S, k and s are 
important, α extremely volatile. 
The social uncertainty linked to Ss imply not to destabilize the social 
structure; stabilization is not only a monetarist imperative against inflation and 
deficits, it must be enlarged to social disagreements (Kanbur 2008), such as 
genocide. A social stabilization policy must improve a prudential principle 
where the incertainty linked to social sustainability is strong: the market cannot 
compensate human massacres. The dead will never come back… 
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